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Abstract. For half a century, authors have weakened the rule of necessitation in
various more or less ad hoc ways in order to make inconsistent systems consistent. More
recently, necessitation was weakened in a systematic way, not for the purpose of resolving
paradoxes but rather to salvage the deduction theorem for modal logic. We show how this
systematic weakening can be applied to the older problem of paradox resolution. Four
examples are given: a predicate symbol S4 consistent with arithmetic; a resolution of the
surprise examination paradox; a resolution of Fitch’s paradox; and finally, the construction
of a knowing machine which knows its own code. We discuss a technique for possibly finding
answers to a question of P. E´gre´ and J. van Benthem.
§1. Introduction To make a certain system consistent, Myhill (1960) sug-
gested (pp. 469-470) weakening the rule of necessitation to only range over arith-
metical formulas. Since then, others have suggested various other weakenings of
necessitation to make other systems consistent. Halbach (2008) restricted necessi-
tation to formulas not involving a particular predicate; E´gre´ (2005) hinted (p. 44)
at separating necessitation from soundness. Meanwhile, Fitting (2007) weakened
necessitation in a different way, not to repair inconsistencies but instead to recover
the deduction theorem for modal logic (see Hakli & Negri (2012) for a survey on
this issue). Fitting’s weakening has the advantage that it is very systematic. We
apply it to the older objective of fixing inconsistencies.
Suppose we have some axioms which are divided into global and local axioms.
The rule of global necessitation for a modal operator K is as follows:
φ
K(φ)
provided φ has been proved without appeal to global axioms.
The rule of global necessitation for a predicate symbol K is the same, except that
φ/K(φ) is replaced by φ/K(pφq). The idea is that a global axiom is one which is
thoroughly trusted by the agent whose knowledge (or belief or...) is represented by
K, whereas a local axiom is true, but may not be known by the agent, or may be
known with low conviction.
Formally, if a system S consists of a set of global axioms, a set of local axioms,
and the rule of global necessitation for K (and modus ponens, which we hereafter
implicitly include in every system), we say S |= φ if there is a sequence φ1, . . . , φn
such that φn is φ and such that for every i,
1. φi is a local axiom, or
2. φi is a global axiom, or
3. φi is logically valid, or
4. φi follows from two earlier members of the sequence by modus ponens, or
5. φi is K(φj) (or K(pφjq) if K is a predicate symbol) for some j < i such that
for every 1 ≤ k ≤ j, φk is an instance of one of items (2)-(5) of this list.
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For example, the system GLS of provability logic (Boolos (1993) p. 65) is equiv-
alent to a system with global axioms the axioms of GL, local axiom schema T , and
the rule of global necessitation.
The idea for this weakened necessitation appeared in Fitting (2007) (p. 94) and
more recently it was used by Hakli & Negri (2012). In both cases it was simply
called the rule of necessitation; we have called it the rule of global necessitation so
as to distinguish it from its stronger ancestor.
The following lemma (compare the suggestion of Smorynski (1984) (p. 454), as
described by Hakli & Negri (2012) (p. 854)) is very useful for showing consistency
of systems involving the rule of global necessitation. To state it succinctly, we adopt
the following notation: if K is a modal operator, K[φ] will denote K(φ), and if K
is a predicate symbol, K[φ] will denote K(pφq).
Lemma 1.1. Assume a logic where the compactness theorem holds. Suppose S is
a system consisting of a set Sg of global axioms, a set Sℓ of local axioms, and the
rule of global necessitation for K. Let S′ be the following system of axioms:
1. φ, if φ ∈ Sg.
2. K[φ] if φ is logically valid.
3. K[φ→ ψ]→ K[φ]→ K[ψ].
4. K[φ] if φ is an instance of (1)-(3) or (recursively) (4).
5. φ, if φ ∈ Sℓ.
For any φ, if S |= φ, then S′ |= φ.
Proof. Let S0 be the system consisting of axioms Sg and the rule of global
necessitation. Let S′0 be the set of axioms from lines (1)–(4) of S
′. We claim: For
any φ, if S0 |= φ then S
′
0 |= φ. This is proved by induction on proof length from
S0. The only interesting case is when φ is K[φ0], where S0 |= φ0 in fewer steps. By
induction, S′0 |= φ0. By compactness, there are s1, . . . , sn ∈ S
′
0 such that
s1 → · · · → sn → φ0
is valid. By (2),
S′0 |= K[s1 → · · · → sn → φ0].
By repeated applications of (3),
S′0 |= K[s1]→ · · · → K[sn]→ K[φ0].
By (4), for each i, K[si] ∈ S
′
0, since each si ∈ S
′
0 and S
′
0 is closed under K. Thus
S′0 |= K[φ0], as desired.
Now we attack the main lemma itself, again by induction on proof length. Suppose
S |= φ. There is only one nontrivial case: φ is K[φ0] where S |= φ0 in fewer steps
and φ is obtained from that shorter proof by the rule of global necessitation. Since
φ is so obtained, this means every step in the proof of φ0 is an instance of lines
(2)-(5) of the definition of proof on the previous page. This implies S0 |= φ0, and
thus S0 |= K[φ0], and so by the claim, S
′
0 |= K[φ0], so certainly S
′ |= K[φ0]. 
The bulk of the paper will concern modal operator paradoxes. The reason for
this is that, due to self-reference, systems involving full necessitation for a predicate
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symbol blow up extremely easily1, and thus the well-known paradoxes (see E´gre´
(2005)) tend to be low-level, by which I mean they usually derive contradiction from
some set of assumptions which is (equivalent to) a tiny fragment of a predicate-
symbol S42. Thus, the following theorem more or less resolves them all in one fell
swoop (and might, therefore, be a tentative step toward resolving tensions described
in sections 1 & 2 of Halbach & Welch (2009)).
Theorem 1.2. (A predicate symbol version of weakened S4, consistent with arith-
metic) The following system is consistent (in the language of Peano Arithmetic
extended by a predicate symbol K):
1. (Global) The axioms of Peano Arithmetic.
2. (Global) K(pφ→ ψq)→ K(pφq)→ K(pψq).
3. (Global) K(pφq)→ K(pK(pφq)q).
4. (Local) K(pφq)→ φ.
5. The rule of global necessitation.
(We’ll discuss the philosophical plausibility of localizing soundness like this in
the Conclusion.)
Proof. Let S′ be the following system:
1. The axioms of Peano Arithmetic.
2. K(pφ→ ψq)→ K(pφq)→ K(pψq).
3. K(pφq)→ K(pK(pφq)q).
4. K(pφq) whenever φ is valid.
5. K(pφq) whenever φ is an instance of (1)–(4) or (recursively) (5).
6. K(pφq)→ φ.
By Lemma 1.1., we need only show S′ is consistent.
In the absense of non-modus ponens rules of inference, consistency is easy to
prove: merely construct a model. Let S′0 consist of the axioms in lines (1)-(5) of S
′.
Let N be the model which has universe N, which interprets symbols of PA in the
intended ways, and which interprets K as follows:
N |= K(pφq) iff S′0 |= φ
(we do not care how N interprets K(n) if n is not the Go¨del number of a formula).
We will show that N |= S′, proving the theorem.
Preliminary Claim: whenever S′0 |= φ, S
′
0 |= K(pφq). To see this, suppose S
′
0 |= φ.
By compactness, there are s1, . . . , sn ∈ S
′
0 such that
s1 → · · · → sn → φ
is valid. It follows S′0 |= K(pφq) by an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 1.1..
Armed with the claim, we show N |= S′. Suppose σ ∈ S′, we will show N |= σ.
1 In Montague (1963) (p. 294) (also quoted in E´gre´ (2005)) we find: “...if necessity is to
be treated syntactically ... then virtually all of modal logic, even the weak system S1,
is to be sacrificed.”
2 One exception is the predicate symbol treatment of the surprise examination paradox,
but that paradox has an equally good modal operator treatment anyway. Another
exception appears in Horsten & Leitgeb (2001), more on that in our Conclusion below.
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Case 1: σ is an axiom of Peano Arithmetic. Then N |= σ because N has universe
N and interprets symbols of PA in their intended ways.
Case 2: σ is K(pφ → ψq) → K(pφq) → K(pψq). Assume N |= K(pφ → ψq)
and N |= K(pφq). By definition this means S′0 |= φ → ψ and S
′
0 |= φ. By modus
ponens, S′0 |= ψ, so N |= K(pψq), as desired.
Case 3: σ isK(pφq)→ K(pK(pφq)q). Assume N |= K(pφq). This means S′0 |= φ.
By the preliminary claim, S′0 |= K(pφq), which shows N |= K(pK(pφq)q).
Case 4: σ is K(pφq) where φ is valid. Since φ is valid, certainly S′0 |= φ, so
N |= K(pφq).
Case 5: σ is K(pφq) where φ is an instance of (1)-(5) of S′. Then φ ∈ S′0, so
S′0 |= φ, so N |= K(pφq).
Case 6: σ is K(pφq) → φ. Assume N |= K(pφq), which means S′0 |= φ. Note
that, by Cases 1–5, N |= S′0. Since N |= S
′
0 and S
′
0 |= φ, N |= φ, completing the
proof. 
Although we expressed Theorem 1.2. as a result about knowledge, it could just as
well be couched as a result about truth predicates (thickening the plot of Friedman & Sheard
(1987)).
§2. Myhill’s Necessitation and a Moore’s Paradox Myhill (1960) made
a certain system consistent by forcing necessitation’s premises to be arithmetical.
This differs from our approach: Myhill’s weak necessitation discriminates based on
the form of the premise, whereas ours discriminates on the origin of the premise. In
this section, we exhibit a paradox thwarting Myhill’s method but repairable with
global necessitation.
Let Ψ be a sentence (in the language of Peano arithmetic) which is true about N
but independent of PA. For example Ψ could be Con(PA) or Ψ could be Goodstein’s
Theorem (see Kirby & Paris (1982)). Thus the Peano arithmetist does not know
Ψ, although Ψ is true.
We might, therefore, attempt to study arithmetists’ knowledge using a system
consisting of the axioms of PA, Ψ, ¬K(pΨq), and the rule of necessitation. Of course
this would be very flawed (and provably inconsistent with a very short proof):
the rule of necessitation should not be allowed to interact with Ψ because the
arithmetist does not know Ψ! None of this is surprising, the only reason we bring it
up is to point out that Myhill’s weakening of necessitation, restricting it to purely
arithmetical premises, has no effect here. On the other hand, the rule of global
necessitation can be used to articulate the system properly.
Theorem 2.3. The following system is consistent (K a predicate symbol):
1. (Global) The axioms of Peano Arithmetic.
2. (Local) Ψ.
3. (Local) ¬K(pΨq).
4. The rule of global necessitation.
Though the theorem may rightly be considered silly, the proof introduces a useful
trick.
Proof. By Lemma 1.1., it suffices to show the following system S′ is consistent:
1. The axioms of Peano Arithmetic.
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2. K(pφq) whenever φ is valid.
3. K(pφ→ ψq)→ K(pφq)→ K(pψq).
4. K(pφq) whenever φ is an instance of (1)-(4).
5. Ψ.
6. ¬K(pΨq).
Let S′0 be the set of axioms in lines (1)-(4) of S
′. Let N be a model with universe
N, interpreting symbols of PA in the intended ways, and interpreting knowledge so
that
N |= K(pφq) iff S′0 |= φ.
We will show N |= S′, proving the theorem. The tricky part is to show N |=
¬K(pΨq). For that we need:
Preliminary Claim: S′0 6|= Ψ.
In the absense of non-modus ponens rules of inference, to show a theory does
not prove a formula, it suffices to build a model of the theory where the formula is
untrue. Here, it suffices to build a model of S′0 where Ψ is untrue.
Since Ψ is independent of PA, there is a (nonstandard) model M , in the language
of PA, such that M |= PA and M |= ¬Ψ. We will extend M to a model M ′ in
the language of PA plus K. To do so we must specify how M ′ is to interpret K.
Let M ′ interpret K so that
M ′ |= K(pφq) for every φ
(loosely: M ′ “knows everything”). I claim M ′ |= S′0. To see this, let τ ∈ S
′
0, we
will show M ′ |= τ .
Case 1: τ is an axiom of PA. Then M ′ |= τ since M |= τ and M ′ agrees with
M on the language of PA.
Case 2: τ is K(pφq) where φ is valid. Then M ′ |= K(pφq) since M ′ knows
everything.
Case 3: τ is K(pφ → ψq) → K(pφq) → K(pψq). We have M ′ |= K(pψq) since
M ′ knows everything.
Case 4: τ is K(pφq) where φ is an instance of (1)-(4). Then M ′ |= K(pφq) since
M ′ knows everything.
Thus M ′ |= S′0. And M
′ 6|= Ψ since M 6|= Ψ and M ′ agrees with M on the
language of PA. This proves the preliminary claim (in fact by arbitrariness of Ψ it
proves S′0 is a conservative extension of PA).
For the theorem itself, let σ ∈ S′, I claim N |= σ.
Case 1: σ is an axiom of Peano Arithmetic. Then N |= σ since N extends N.
Case 2: σ is K(pφq) where φ is valid. Since φ is valid, S′0 |= φ, thus N |= K(pφq).
Case 3: σ is K(pφ→ ψq)→ K(pφq)→ K(pψq). Assume N |= K(pφ→ ψq) and
N |= K(pφq). That means S′0 |= φ → ψ and S
′
0 |= φ. By modus ponens, S
′
0 |= ψ,
so N |= K(pψq).
Case 4: σ is K(pφq) where φ is an instance of (1)-(4). Then φ ∈ S′0, hence S
′
0 |= φ
and N |= K(pφq).
Case 5: σ is Ψ. We have N |= Ψ since N extends N.
Case 6: σ is ¬K(pΨq). By the Preliminary Claim, S′0 6|= Ψ. Thus N 6|= K(pΨq),
as desired, proving the theorem. 
Whenever we establish a consistency result by localizing certain schemas, a
natural question is what is the minimum set of schemas we can localize and obtain
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consistency. It is clear that we cannot strengthen Theorem 2.3. by globalizing Ψ.
And by Lo¨b’s Theorem it follows we cannot globalize ¬K(pΨq) either, so in some
sense Theorem 2.3. is sharp. Remarkably, though, the same system, formulated
using a modal operator instead of a predicate symbol, can be further sharpened.
Theorem 2.4. The following system is consistent (K a modal operator):
1. (Global) The axioms of Peano Arithmetic.
2. (Local) Ψ.
3. (Global) ¬K(Ψ).
4. The rule of global necessitation.
To prove the theorem, we need a technical lemma which we’ll use again later.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose K is a modal operator, S is a set of axioms, and K(S) (the
K-closure of S) is the set of axioms
1. φ, if φ ∈ S.
2. K(φ), if φ is an instance of (1) or (recursively) (2).
Suppose N is a model in which K is interpreted so that N |= K(φ) iff N |= φ. If
N |= S then N |= K(S).
Proof. Assume N |= S. We prove by induction on formula complexity that for all
φ ∈ K(S), N |= φ.
Case 1: φ is of the form K(φ0) for some φ0. If φ ∈ S we are done. If φ 6∈ S, then
φ is an instance of line (2) of K(S), and thus φ0 ∈ K(S). By induction, N |= φ0,
and thus N |= K(φ0).
Case 2: φ is not of the form K(φ0). Then φ must be an instance of line (1) of
K(S), i.e., φ ∈ S, and N |= φ by assumption. 
Like Theorem 2.3., the proof of Theorem 2.4. introduces a trick which we’ll use
again later.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.. By Lemma 1.1., it suffices to show the following system
S′ is consistent:
1. The axioms of Peano Arithmetic.
2. ¬K(Ψ).
3. K(φ) whenever φ is valid.
4. K(φ→ ψ)→ K(φ)→ K(ψ).
5. K(φ) whenever φ is an instance of (1)-(5).
6. Ψ.
Let S′0 consist of lines (1)-(5). Let N be a model with universe N, interpreting
symbols of PA in the intended ways, and interpreting K so that
N |= K(φ) iff S′0 |= φ.
We’ll show N |= S′, proving the theorem. As before, the tricky part is showing
N |= ¬K(Ψ). For that we’ll need the same preliminary claim as before, but now
with a different proof.
Preliminary Claim: S′0 6|= Ψ.
To prove S′0 6|= Ψ it’s enough to build a model of S
′
0 where Ψ fails. Since PA 6|= Ψ,
there is a (nonstandard) model M (in the language of PA) such that M |= PA and
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M 6|= Ψ. Extend M to a model M ′ in the language of PA plus K, by recursively
letting
M ′ |= K(φ) iff M ′ |= φ
for every formula φ (this would, of course, be impossible if K were a predicate
symbol). I claim M ′ |= S′0. To see this, let τ ∈ S
′
0, we’ll show M
′ |= τ .
Case 1: τ is an axiom of PA. Then M ′ |= τ since M |= τ and M ′ agrees with
M on the language of PA.
Case 2: τ is ¬K(Ψ). By definition, M ′ |= K(Ψ) iff M ′ |= Ψ. And M ′ 6|= Ψ since
M 6|= Ψ and they agree on the language of PA. So M ′ |= ¬K(Ψ).
Case 3: τ is K(φ) where φ is valid. Since φ is valid, M ′ |= φ, thus M ′ |= K(φ).
Case 4: τ is K(φ→ ψ) → K(φ) → K(ψ). Assume M ′ |= K(φ → ψ) and M ′ |=
K(φ). This means M ′ |= φ→ ψ and M ′ |= φ. Thus M ′ |= ψ, so M ′ |= K(ψ).
Case 5: τ is K(φ) where φ is an instance of (1)-(5). Then M ′ |= τ by Lemma 2.5..
This establishes M ′ |= S′0. And M
′ 6|= Ψ, since M 6|= Ψ and the two agree on
the language of PA, therefore S′0 6|= Ψ and the claim is proved.
Now back to the main theorem, for σ ∈ S′, we must show N |= σ. This splits
the proof into the same six cases as Theorem 2.3., and the six cases are proved in
exactly the same ways as in Theorem 2.3., so we omit them. The crucial difference
was the different proof of the Preliminary Claim. 
This has an interesting informal application to non-idealized epistemology. As a
mathematician, I would like to be able to state the following Moore’s paradox:
• Peano Arithmetic (or ZFC) is true,
• The Four-Color Theorem is true (I trust Appel & Haken (1977)),
• I do not know that the Four-Color Theorem is true (I have utmost confidence
I will not discover a proof of it in my lifetime),
and operate using the rule of global necessitation (¬K(4CT ) being global, and 4CT
being local). Strictly speaking, this is inconsistent; but we won’t obtain contradic-
tion through purely epistemological means, as the system would be consistent if
4CT were independent. I believe I can work in this system my whole life and not
state a contradiction. See Shapiro (2012) p. 7 for a similar example.
The proofs of Theorems 2.3. & 2.4. highlight a difference between operators and
predicates: with operators, we can prove 6|= by constructing toy models where the
operator is interpreted as truth, which is impossible with predicates.
§3. Example: The Surprise Examination Paradox The surprise exami-
nation paradox hardly needs an introduction (but the survey by Chow (1998) is
worthy of pleasure-reading). For a formalization, we turn to McLelland & Chihara
(1975), where we find the following system laid out on pp. 76–77 (the language is
propositional, with atoms p1, . . . , pn, where n is the number of days in the week
and pi is read as “the examination takes place on the ith day”, further extended
by a modal operator K, with K(φ) read as “φ is known just prior to the exam”):
1. K(φ)→ φ.
2. K(φ→ ψ)→ K(φ)→ K(ψ).
3. Tn, by which is meant p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn (“an exam will occur”).
4.
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi) (“it will be a surprise”).
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5.
∧n
i=1((¬Ti) → K(¬Ti)), where Ti abbreviates p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pi (“exam non-
occurrences are observable”).
6. The rule of necessitation.
The above system is inconsistent, due to the surprise examination paradox. We
would like to make it consistent by weakening necessitation. Following the example
in Section 1 in which we made S4 consistent for predicate symbols by localizing
soundness, we might attempt to resolve the surprise examination paradox in the
same way. But it is not difficult to see that the above system remains inconsistent
even with K(φ)→ φ localized and necessitation replaced by global necessitation (in
fact, the system remains inconsistent even if the K(φ) → φ schema is completely
removed).
It is possible to show the system becomes consistent if we localize both K(φ)→ φ
and
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi). This is unsatisfactory, though, because to localize the latter
axiom is to suggest the students ignored the “surprise” part of the surprise examina-
tion announcement or didn’t take it very seriously. Fortunately, Kritchman & Raz
(2010) come to our rescue. When McLelland and Chihara laid down their for-
mulation of the paradox, they did so with the understanding that an event is
surprising precisely if it is unknown just prior to its occurrence. Kritchman and
Raz point out that, under this definition of surprise, an inconsistent knower is never
surprised, since an inconsistent knower knows everything (the same was observed
by Halpern & Moses (1986) some time earlier). It seems that if I know everything
(including contradictions), that’s as bad as knowing nothing whatsoever. Therefore,
we should admit a different definition of surprise:
An event is surprising if either 1) it is unknown just prior to its
occurrence, or 2) a contradiction is known.
We know (locally) that the students in the surprise exam paradox are sound, so to
us, the two definitions of surprise are equivalent. But the students do not necessarily
know as much. Based on this, the axiom
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi) should be weakened to
(
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi)) ∨K(⊥) where ⊥ is some contradiction (such as p1 ∧ ¬p1). Having
done so, we can keep it global, obtaining a more satisfactory resolution to the
paradox.
Theorem 3.6. Assume n > 1. The following system is consistent:
1. (Local) K(φ)→ φ.
2. (Global) K(φ→ ψ)→ K(φ)→ K(ψ).
3. (Global) Tn, by which is meant p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn.
4. (Global) (
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi)) ∨K(⊥).
5. (Global)
∧n
i=1((¬Ti)→ K(¬Ti)), where Ti abbreviates p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pi.
6. The rule of global necessitation.
Proof. By Lemma 1.1., it suffices to prove consistency of the following system S′:
1. K(φ→ ψ)→ K(φ)→ K(ψ).
2. Tn, by which is meant p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn.
3. (
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi)) ∨K(⊥).
4.
∧n
i=1((¬Ti)→ K(¬Ti)), where Ti abbreviates p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pi.
5. K(φ) whenever φ is valid.
6. K(φ) whenever φ is an instance of (1)-(6).
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7. K(φ)→ φ.
Let S′0 consist of the first six lines of S
′. Let N be a model where p1 is true, pi is
false for i > 1, and K is interpreted so that
N |= K(φ) iff S′0 |= φ.
We will show N |= S′, proving the theorem. To do that, we need a preliminary
claim.
Preliminary Claim: For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S′0 6|= pi.
Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since S′0 involves no non-modus ponens rules, it suffices to build
a model of S′0 where pi fails. Since n > 1, there is some 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that j 6= i.
Let M be the model where pj is true, pk is false for all k 6= j, and knowledge is
interpreted so that
M |= K(φ) for every φ,
i.e., M knows everything. I claim M |= S′0. Since M 6|= pi, this will prove the
preliminary claim. To see M |= S′0, let τ ∈ S
′
0, we’ll show M |= τ .
Case 1: τ is K(φ → ψ) → K(φ) → K(ψ). Well, M |= K(ψ) since M knows
everything.
Case 2: τ is Tn. Then M |= τ since M |= pj .
Case 3: τ is (
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi)) ∨K(⊥). Then M |= τ since M |= K(⊥).
Case 4: τ is
∧n
i=1((¬Ti) → K(¬Ti)). It suffices to show M |= K(¬Tk) for an
arbitrary 1 ≤ k ≤ n. This is true because M knows everything.
Case 5/6: τ is K(φ) where φ is valid or φ is an instance of (1)-(6). Then M |=
K(φ) since M knows everything.
This shows M |= S′0, and so since M 6|= pi, S
′
0 6|= pi. The Preliminary Claim is
proved.
Back to the main theorem, to show N |= S′, let σ ∈ S′, we’ll show N |= σ.
Case 1: σ is K(φ → ψ) → K(φ) → K(ψ). Suppose N |= K(φ → ψ) and
N |= K(φ). This means S′0 |= φ→ ψ and S
′
0 |= φ. Thus S
′
0 |= ψ and N |= K(ψ).
Case 2: σ is Tn. Then N |= σ since N |= p1.
Case 3: σ is (
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi)) ∨K(⊥). To show N |= σ it suffices to let 1 ≤ i ≤ n
be arbitrary and show N |= ¬K(pi). By the Preliminary Claim, S
′
0 6|= pi, thus
N 6|= K(pi), as desired.
Case 4: σ is
∧n
i=1((¬Ti)→ K(¬Ti)). Then N |= σ vacuously, because
3 N 6|= ¬Ti
for any i, because N |= p1.
Case 5: σ is K(φ) where φ is valid. Since φ is valid, S′0 |= φ, so N |= K(φ).
Case 6: σ is K(φ) where φ is an instance of (1)-(6). Then φ ∈ S′0, so S
′
0 |= φ, so
N |= K(φ).
Case 7: σ is K(φ)→ φ. Suppose N |= K(φ). This means S′0 |= φ. By Cases 1-6,
N |= S′0. Since N |= S
′
0 and S
′
0 |= φ, N |= φ and our work is finished. 
3 This technique fails if we want to make p1 false in N , i.e. if we want the surprise
examination to fall on a day other than Monday. The proof can be altered, at the price
of slightly more complexity, to allow a surprise exam on any day except for day n. For
a surprise exam on day 1 < k < n, one would add ¬Tk−1 as a global axiom to the
system and adjust the proof accordingly, and in the proof of the Preliminary Claim,
choose j > k.
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§4. Example: Fitch’s Paradox Fitch’s Paradox, first published in Fitch (1963),
is the fact that under certain assumptions, if every true fact is knowable then
every true fact is known. See Salerno (2010) for an introduction, though we part
ways when it comes to the exact system to use4. Instead we turn to Costa-Leite
(2006) who obtained the following system by very systematic means (the language
is propositional, extended by modal operators K and , and (if we understand
correctly) ⋄ abbreviates ¬¬):
1. (φ→ ψ)→ ((φ)→ (ψ)).
2. (K(φ→ ψ) ∧K(φ))→ K(ψ).
3. K(φ)→ φ.
4. The knowability thesis: φ→ ⋄(K(φ)).
5. -necessitation: φ/(φ).
6. K-necessitation: φ/K(φ).
From these, the omniscience principle schema, φ→ K(φ), can be deduced by what
is known as the Church-Fitch argument. This is considered a paradox since it seems
plausible that all truths are knowable (φ→ ⋄(K(φ))) but it seems absurd that we
are omniscient. We would like to weaken necessitation to remove this unwanted
consequence. It turns out that if we localize K(φ) → φ, it resolves the paradox so
strongly, we can even strengthen the knowability thesis.
Theorem 4.7. Let L be a propositional language (with at least one atom q)
extended by modal operators K and . Let S be the following system in L :
1. (Global) (φ→ ψ)→ ((φ)→ (ψ)).
2. (Global) (K(φ→ ψ) ∧K(φ))→ K(ψ).
3. (Local) K(φ)→ φ.
4. (Global) The strong knowability thesis: ⋄(K(φ)).
5. The rule of global necessitation for .
6. The rule of global necessitation for K.
Then S 6|= q → K(q).
Proof. By a straightforward variation of Lemma 1.1., it suffices to show S′ 6|= q →
K(q), where S′ is:
1. (φ→ ψ)→ ((φ)→ (ψ)).
2. (K(φ→ ψ) ∧K(φ))→ K(ψ).
3. The strong knowability thesis: ⋄(K(φ)).
4. K(φ) whenever φ is valid.
5. (φ) whenever φ is valid.
6. K(φ) whenever φ is an instance of (1)-(7).
7. (φ) whenever φ is an instance of (1)-(7).
8. K(φ)→ φ.
4 I should confess here that in Alexander (preprint) I committed a grave sin: I misread
Salerno’s system and attributed a different system to him for which he was not
responsible.
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Let S′0 consist of lines (1)-(7) of S
′ and let N be a model in which q is true and K
and  are interpreted so
N |= K(φ) iff S′0 |= φ, and N |= (φ) iff S
′
0 |= φ
(we admit this is a very unusual semantics for , but since the theorem we are
proving is entirely syntactical, that should not matter). We will show N |= S′ and
N 6|= q → K(q). Since S′ involves no non-modus ponens rules of inference, this
will show S′ 6|= q → K(q) and prove the theorem.
Preliminary Claim: There is a model M such that M |= S′0, M 6|= q, and
M 6|= ¬K(φ) for every formula φ.
Let M be a model in which q is false, K is interpreted so that
M |= K(φ) for every φ,
and  is interpreted recursively so that
M |= (φ) iff M |= φ.
Right away M 6|= q and M 6|= ¬K(φ), it remains to show M |= S′0. Let τ ∈ S
′
0, we
will show M |= τ .
Case 1: τ is (φ → ψ) → ((φ) → (ψ)). The way M interprets , to show
M |= τ we must show M |= (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ), but this is a tautology.
Case 2: τ is (K(φ→ ψ) ∧K(φ))→ K(ψ). Then M |= τ because M |= K(ψ).
Case 3: τ is ⋄(K(φ)). Unwrapping the abbreviation, τ is ¬(¬K(φ)). By the way
M interprets , we must show M |= ¬(¬K(φ)), i.e. M |= K(φ), which is true by
the way M interprets K.
Case 4/5: τ is K(φ) or (φ), where φ is valid. Trivial.
Case 6: τ is K(φ) where φ is an instance of (1)-(7). Trivial.
Case 7: τ is (φ) where φ is an instance of (1)-(7). Then M |= τ by Lemma 2.5..
This shows M |= S′0 and proves the Preliminary Claim.
Back to the main theorem, we have two things to show: that N 6|= q → K(q), and
that N |= S′. Since N |= q, to show N 6|= q → K(q) we must show N 6|= K(q),
i.e., that S′0 6|= q. But this is true by the Preliminary Claim: there is a model where
S′0 holds and q fails.
To show N |= S′, let σ ∈ S′, we will show N |= S′.
Case 1/2: σ is (φ→ ψ)→ ((φ)→ (ψ)) or (K(φ→ ψ)∧K(φ))→ K(ψ). By
now, this case should be straightforward.
Case 3: σ is ⋄(K(φ)). That is, σ is ¬(¬K(φ)). By the Preliminary Claim, there
is a structure where S′0 holds and ¬K(φ) fails. Since there are no non-modus ponens
rules of inference in S′0, this shows S
′
0 6|= ¬K(φ). Thus N 6|= (¬K(φ)), as desired.
Case 4/5: σ is K(φ) or (φ), where φ is valid. Trivial.
Case 6/7: σ is K(φ) or (φ), where φ is an instance of (1)-(7). Then φ ∈ S′0, thus
S′0 |= φ, thus N |= K(φ) ∧(φ).
Case 8: σ is K(φ) → φ. Suppose N |= K(φ), which means S′0 |= φ. By Cases
1-7, N |= S′0. Thus N |= φ. This proves the theorem. 
The above theorem is strictly stronger than the second theorem of Alexander
(preprint), in which the knowability thesis was also localized along with K(φ)→ φ.
To prove Theorem 4.7., we constructed a model in which K and  were inter-
preted identically. Thus we could strengthen Theorem 4.7. by adding K(φ)↔ (φ)
as a local axiom (call it K = ). Could we add this axiom globally? The answer
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turns out to be “no”; one can see this by using the variation on the Church-Fitch
argument which I published in Alexander (2012). It is, however, possible to globalize
K =  and avoid paradox if, in exchange, the knowability thesis is localized:
Theorem 4.8. The following system does not prove q → K(q):
1. (Global) (φ→ ψ)→ ((φ)→ (ψ)).
2. (Global) (K(φ→ ψ) ∧K(φ))→ K(ψ).
3. (Global) K(φ)↔ (φ).
4. (Local) K(φ)→ φ.
5. (Local) The strong knowability thesis: ⋄(K(φ)).
6. The rule of global necessitation for .
7. The rule of global necessitation for K.
Proof Sketch. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.7., with S′ and S′0 modified in the
obvious ways. The crucial difference is the proof of the Preliminary Claim. When
constructing the model M of the Preliminary Claim, make it interpret K and 
so that
M |= K(φ) for all φ, and M |= (φ) for all φ.
Note that M will then fail the knowability thesis– but that is fine, since the
knowability thesis is no longer in S′0– but satisfy K(φ)↔ (φ). 
In summary we can say the following about the structure of Fitch’s paradox (G
stands for global, L stands for local):
• G-Soundness + L-Knowability |= Paradox (Fitch (1963)).
• L-Soundness +G-Knowability 6|= Paradox (Theorem 4.7.).
• G-Knowability +G-(K = ) |= Paradox (Alexander (2012)).
• G-(K = ) + L-Knowability + L-Soundess 6|= Paradox (Theorem 4.8.).
In Halbach (2008) we were asked, “What if the preferred remedy for the paradox
of the Knower and other paradoxes of self-reference also helps to resolve Fitch’s
paradox?” In light of Theorems 1.2. and 4.7. it seems we’ve achieved precisely that,
at least if preferred is read as “preferred by the present author”.
§5. Example: Machines which know their own codes It is considered a
well-known fact that if a mechanical knowing agent is capable of logic and arithmetic
and self-reflection, then that machine cannot know the index of a Turing machine
representing it. See Lucas (1961), Benacerraf (1967), Reinhardt (1985a), Penrose
(1989), Carlson (2000), and Putnam (2006)5. However, the proofs involve unre-
stricted necessitation in various guises. We will weaken necessitation and explicitly
construct a machine which knows its own code.
Following Carlson (2000), we work in the language of Peano Arithmetic extended
by a modal operator K (i.e., the language of Epistemic Arithmetic of Shapiro
(1988)). For de re semantics we use Carlson’s base logic. To paraphrase and sum-
marize: a structure for a modal language consists of a first-order structure N for
5 Putnam does not speak so much about arbitrary machines which know their own code,
but rather argues that the totality of scientific knowledge is not a machine which knows
its own code.
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its first-order part, together with a function which takes a purely modal formula
K(φ) and a variable assignment s and outputs True or False– in which case we write
N |= K(φ)[s] or N 6|= K(φ)[s] respectively– satisfying some technical conditions
which we will here brush under the rug.
If φ is a formula with free variables x1, . . . , xn (and no others), a universal closure
of φ is ∀x1 · · · ∀xnφ. To prove that a given model N satisfies a universal closure of
φ, it suffices to let s be an arbitrary assignment and show N |= φ[s].
It follows from Carlson (2000) (specifically from Proposition 3.2, Definitions 3.1
and 3.4, and the discussion on p. 54) that the following system is inconsistent (this
can be glossed as “a machine cannot know its own code”):
1. S4, by which is meant
(a) Universal closures of K(φ→ ψ)→ K(φ)→ K(ψ).
(b) Universal closures of K(φ)→ φ.
(c) Universal closures of K(φ)→ K(K(φ)).
(d) The rule of necessitation.
2. The axioms of Epistemic Arithmetic (i.e., Peano Arithmetic, with the induc-
tion schema extended to our modal language).
3. (Knowledge of Code) ∃eK(∀x(K(φ) ↔ x ∈ We)), when x is the lone free
variable of φ.
• Here We is the eth r.e. set and x ∈ We abbreviates a formula stating
that x lies therein.
We will localize (1b) and show the resulting system is ω-consistent by explicitly
constructing a machine which knows its own code (via Kleene’s Recursion The-
orem). Our machine construction method is somewhat similar to the method of
Carlson (2000) and Carlson (2012). Whereas my goal is a truthful machine which
knows its own code at the cost of its own truth, Carlson’s goal was a truthful
machine which knew its own truth and knew it had some code, articulated by
Reinhardt’s Strong Mechanistic Thesis: K(∃e∀x(K(φ) ↔ x ∈ We)). To do this
Carlson used a very careful analysis of ordinal arithmetic (Carlson (1999)), later
organized into patterns of resemblance in Carlson (2001). The reason Carlson’s goal
took so much work was precisely because his machines knew their own truthfulness
globally; by localizing that, we’ll have much less difficulty reaching our own goal.
For every n ∈ N, let Sn be the following system:
1. Weakened S4, by which is meant
(a) (Global) Universal closures of K(φ→ ψ)→ K(φ)→ K(ψ).
(b) (Local) Universal closures of K(φ)→ φ.
(c) (Global) Universal closures of K(φ)→ K(K(φ)).
(d) The rule of global necessitation.
2. (Global) The axioms of Epistemic Arithmetic (i.e., Peano Arithmetic, with
induction extended to the modal language).
3. (Global) (Having Code n) ∀x(K(φ) ↔ 〈x, pφq〉 ∈ Wn), provided x is the lone
free variable in φ.
• Here 〈x, pφq〉 ∈Wn abbreviates a formula saying 〈x, gn(φ)〉 ∈ Wn where
gn(φ) is the Go¨del number of φ and 〈•, •〉 : N2 → N is a canonical
computable pairing function.
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My goal is to show that there is some n ∈ N such that Sn is ω-consistent.
Assuming I can do that much, we can combine global necessitation with (3) to see
Sn |= K(∀x(K(φ)↔ 〈x, pφq〉 ∈ Wn)),
which implies Sn |= ∃eK(∀x(K(φ)↔ x ∈ We)).
With Lemma 1.1. in mind, for each n ∈ N, let S′n be the system
1. Universal closures of K(φ→ ψ)→ K(φ)→ K(ψ).
2. Universal closures of K(φ)→ K(K(φ)).
3. The axioms of Epistemic Arithmetic.
4. ∀x(K(φ)↔ 〈x, pφq〉 ∈Wn) (x the lone free variable of φ).
5. Universal closures of K(φ) whenever φ is valid (true in every structure ac-
cording to the base logic).
6. K(φ) whenever φ is an instance of (1)-(6).
7. Universal closures of K(φ)→ φ.
Lemma 5.9. For each n ∈ N, and each sentence φ, if Sn |= φ, then S
′
n |= φ.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.1. (Carlson points out that the base logic
satisfies the compactness theorem). 
Thus, we only need show that S′n is ω-consistent for some n ∈ N.
If φ is a formula and s is an assigment, let φs denote the sentence
φ(x1|s(x1))(x2|s(x2)) · · ·
obtained by replacing every free variable in φ by the numeral for its s-value.
For every n ∈ N, let S′n0 be the following set of axioms:
1. Lines (1)-(6) of S′n.
2. (Assigned Validity) φs, for valid φ and s an assignment.
3. K(φ) for each instance of (1)-(3) of S′n0.
Lemma 5.10. There is a total computable function f : N → N such that for every
n ∈ N,
Wf(n) = {〈m, gn(φ)〉 ∈ N : φ is a formula with FV (φ) ⊆ {x} and S
′
n0 |= φ(x|m)}
where φ(x|m) is the result of substituting the numeral m for x in φ.
Proof. By the Church-Turing Thesis (Carlson points out that the base logic satisfies
the completeness theorem; combined with compactness, this implies that the set of
consequences of each r.e. theory is r.e., and the code of the set of consequences of
a theory depends uniformly computably on the code of the theory). 
Corollary 5.11. There is an n ∈ N such that
Wn = {〈m, gn(φ)〉 ∈ N : φ is a formula with FV (φ) ⊆ {x} and S
′
n0 |= φ(x|m)}.
Proof. By Kleene’s Recursion Theorem and Lemma 5.10.. 
Theorem 5.12. Let n be as in Corollary 5.11.. Then Sn is ω-consistent. In other
words, there is a knowing machine which knows that it has code n.
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Proof. As discussed above, it suffices to show S′n is ω-consistent. Let N be a struc-
ture, in the language of Epistemic Arithmetic, with universe N, which interprets
symbols of PA in the intended ways, and which interprets knowledge according to
N |= K(φ)[s] iff S′n0 |= φ
s.
We will show that N |= S′n. First we need a couple preliminary claims.
Claim 1: For each formula φ and assignment s, N |= φ[s] iff N |= φs.
By induction on formula complexity. The only interesting case is when φ isK(φ0).
If N |= K(φ0)[s], by definition this means S
′
n0 |= φ
s
0. Since φ
s
0 is a sentence, for
every assignment t we have (φs0)
t = φs0 and thus S
′
n0 |= (φ
s
0)
t. This shows that for
every such t, N |= K(φs0)[t]. By arbitrariness of t, this shows N |= K(φ
s
0). Clearly
K(φs0) ≡ K(φ0)
s. The reverse direction– that if N |= K(φ0)
s then N |= K(φ0)[s]–
is similar.
Claim 2: For each sentence φ, if S′n0 |= φ, then S
′
n0 |= K(φ).
By compactness, if S′n0 |= φ, there are σ1, . . . , σℓ ∈ S
′
n0 such that
σ1 → · · · → σℓ → φ
is valid. By (5) of S′n,
S′n0 |= K(σ1 → · · · → σℓ → φ).
By repeated application of (1) of S′n,
S′n0 |= K(σ1)→ · · · → K(σℓ)→ K(φ).
Since each σi ∈ S
′
n0, each K(σi) ∈ S
′
n0 since S
′
n0 is closed under K. By modus
ponens, S′n0 |= K(φ), as desired.
Armed with these claims, we are ready to show N |= S′n. Let σ ∈ S
′
n, we will
show N |= σ.
Case 1: σ is a universal closure of K(φ → ψ) → K(φ) → K(ψ). Let s be
an assignment and assume N |= K(φ → ψ)[s] and N |= K(φ)[s]. This means
S′n0 |= (φ→ ψ)
s and S′n0 |= φ
s. Clearly (φ→ ψ)s ≡ φs → ψs, so by modus ponens,
S′n0 |= ψ
s, so N |= K(ψ)[s] as desired.
Case 2: σ is a universal closure of K(φ) → K(K(φ)). To get N |= σ, let s be
an arbitrary assignment and assume N |= K(φ)[s]. This means S′n0 |= φ
s. By
Claim 2, S′n0 |= K(φ
s), and clearly K(φs) ≡ K(φ)s, so S′n0 |= K(φ)
s. This shows
N |= K(K(φ))[s], as desired.
Case 3: σ is an axiom of Epistemic Arithmetic. If σ is a basic axiom (such as
∀x(S(x) 6= 0) or ∀x∀y(x · S(y) = x · y + x)), then N |= σ simply because N has
universe N and interprets symbols of PA in the intended ways. But suppose σ is a
universal closure of an instance
φ(x|0)→ (∀x(φ→ φ(x|S(x)))) → ∀xφ
of the induction schema (φ is allowed to involve K). Let s be an assignment and
assume N |= φ(x|0)[s] and N |= ∀x(φ → φ(x|S(x)))[s]. We must show N |=
∀xφ[s].
Since N |= φ(x|0)[s], it follows by Claim 1 that N |= φ(x|0)s. Clearly φ(x|0)s ≡
φs(x|0), where s(x|0) is the assignment which agrees with s except that it maps x
to 0. So N |= φs(x|0).
For each m ∈ N, since N |= ∀x(φ → φ(x|S(x)))[s], in particular N |= φ →
φ(x|S(x))[s(x|m)]. And thus if N |= φ[s(x|m)], then N |= φ(x|S(x))[s(x|m)].
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By Claim 1, that last sentence can be rephrased: if N |= φs(x|m), then N |=
φ(x|S(x))s(x|m); but clearly φ(x|S(x))s(x|m) ≡ φs(x|m+1), so in summary so far:
• N |= φs(x|0).
• For each m ∈ N, if N |= φs(x|m), then N |= φs(x|m+1).
Therefore, by mathematical induction, N |= φs(x|m) for every m ∈ N. This shows
(via Claim 1) that for every m ∈ N, N |= φ[s(x|m)]. This means precisely that
N |= ∀xφ[s], as desired.
Case 4: σ is ∀x(K(φ) ↔ 〈x, pφq〉 ∈ Wn), where x is the lone free variable in φ.
To show N |= σ it suffices to let m ∈ N be arbitrary and prove N |= K(φ) ↔
〈x, pφq〉 ∈ Wn[s] where s is an assignment with s(x) = m. The following are
equivalent:
N |= K(φ)[s]
S′n0 |= φ
s (Definition of N )
S′n0 |= φ(x|m) (Since φ has lone free variable x)
〈m, gn(φ)〉 ∈Wn (By choice of n (Corollary 5.11.))
N |= 〈m, pφq〉 ∈Wn (Since N has standard first-order part)
N |= (〈x, pφq〉 ∈Wn)
s (Since s(x) = m)
N |= 〈x, pφq〉 ∈ Wn[s], (By Claim 1)
as desired.
Case 5: σ is a universal closure of K(φ) where φ is valid. Let s be any assignment.
Since φ is valid, φs is an instance of the Assigned Validity schema from the definition
of S′n0. Thus S
′
n0 |= φ
s, hence N |= K(φ)[s].
Case 6: σ is K(φ) where φ is an instance of (1)-(6) of S′n. Then φ is a sentence
(note: this is where we finally reap our reward for putting all those universal closures
everywhere). So for any assignment s, φ ≡ φs, and so, since (1)-(6) of S′n are
included in S′n0, S
′
n0 |= φ
s, whence N |= φ[s].
Case 7: σ is a universal closure of K(φ)→ φ. Let s be an assignment and assume
N |= K(φ)[s] (so S′n0 |= φ
s); we must show N |= φ[s].
First I claim that N |= S′n0. To see this, let τ ∈ S
′
n0, we’ll show N |= τ .
Subcase 1: τ is an instance of (1)-(6) of S′n. Then N |= τ by Cases 1–6.
Subcase 2: τ is ψt where ψ is valid and t is an assignment. Since ψ is valid,
N |= ψ[t]. By Claim 1, |= ψt.
Subcase 3: τ is K(ψ) where ψ is an instance of (1)-(3) of S′n0. Similar to Case 6
above.
This shows N |= S′n0. Since N |= S
′
n0 and S
′
n0 |= φ
s, N |= φs. By Claim 1,
N |= φ[s], as desired. The theorem is proved. 
What this section has established is that there is a certain dichotomy in machine
knowledge:
A truthful machine can know its own code, or it can know its own
truthfulness, but not both.
In future work we will explore formulations of Theorem 5.12. in which K is a
predicate symbol rather than a modal operator. By localizing soundness, we rule
out the self-referential paradoxes which would normally make predicate symbols
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unimaginable in this role. See Halbach & Welch (2009) for a discussion of the
relative merits of operators vs. predicates.
§6. On a question of E´gre´ and van Benthem At the end of E´gre´ (2005),
the following question appears (attributed to J. van Benthem):
“...from what we saw, schematic Lo¨b’s theorem appears as the
positive counterpart of a negative result ... Could there be other
Lo¨b-style strengthenings of the inconsistency results we have pre-
sented, that provide us with positive information about consistent
subsystems of the conflicting schemata?”
Imagine we did not know Lo¨b’s theorem. One way we might find it is as follows. In
Theorem 1.2. we proved consistency of a weak predicate form of S4, by constructing
a specific model. To probe for things that can be consistently added to the system,
rather than consider the class of all models of the system (which is very hard to
get our hands on), we now have a particular model. Any schema which holds in the
particular model must necessarily be consistent with the system, locally; whether
or not it is consistent globally is another matter, which requires special attention.
One property we might notice about the particular model is that it satisfies Lo¨b’s
theorem. By asking, “can this newfound consistent local axiom be made global,”
we might discover Lo¨b’s schema.
More generally, any time we resolve a paradox by the methods of this paper,
building a particular model, we can look for new consistent local axioms by simply
examining that particular model; we can then attempt to prove (or disprove) they
are consistent globally. For example, as seen at the end of Section 4, this kind of
reasoning lead us to a new variation of the Church-Fitch argument.
If we find a new globally consistent axiom in this way, it might be a candidate to
answer E´gre´’s and van Benthem’s question. If that axiom somehow explains why a
stronger system is inconsistent, even better.
Here are two concrete candidates to answer the question6. First, the schema
(
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi)) ∨ K(⊥) from Section 3. This author initially resolved the surprise
examination paradox by localizing both K(φ) → φ and
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi), but this
was unsatisfactory; but the schema (
∧n
i=1 ¬(pi)) ∨ K(⊥), true in the particular
model, could be globalized. The resulting system was a “consistent subsystem of the
conflicting schemata”, and the new schema “provides us with positive information”
about it.
Likewise the author initially found the schema ⋄(K(φ)) of Section 4 by looking
at a specific model witnessing a consistent subsystem of Fitch’s hypotheses, and
⋄(K(φ)) could be argued to provide positive information about that as well.
Along these same lines, by considering the particular model constructed in Section
5, we might notice it satisfies (x the lone free variable in φ)
(∀x(φ→ K(φ)))→ ∃e∀x(φ↔ x ∈ We),
6 For another possible answer, see Theorem 2 of Friedman (1975).
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and it’s not hard to show this schema can consistently be added to Theorem 5.12.
as a global axiom. This schema (and knowledge thereof) is called an epistemic
Church’s Thesis in Reinhardt (1985b).
§7. Conclusion We have shown that certain paradoxes vanish, and certain
impossibilities become possible, by localizing certain axioms. This should not come
as too much of a surprise. One might justify necessitation by saying that if we can
prove φ, then the knower himself can follow that proof, and therefore knows φ. But
for the knower to follow, the proof must only use axioms the knower is aware of. This
became very clear in Section 2, where paradox occurred despite Myhill’s weakening
of necessitation: we know by second-order logic that Goodstein’s Theorem is true
in N, but when we don our first-order Peano arithmetist hats, that knowledge lacks
conviction. Merely adding the troublesome axiom would be harmless (as it is true),
but its presence invalidates the justification for the rule of necessitation.
In most of our examples, we localized soundness, K(φ) → φ. The fact that this
resolved all those paradoxes gives evidence, in our opinion, that we should take
greater care before assuming K(K(φ) → φ). For further evidence, consider the
paradox of the knower of Kaplan & Montague (1960) (as described in Anderson
(1983) or on p. 21 of E´gre´ (2005)) where K(pK(pφq) → φq) is one of just three
schemas (plus arithmetic) which lead to paradox, the other two schemas being
practically unassailable. And if that is not already a devastating blow against
requiring K(K(φ)→ φ), Thomason (1980) proves that the following system proves
K(pφq) for every φ (see p. 23 of E´gre´ (2005)):
1. K(pφq)→ K(pK(pφq)q),
2. K(pK(pφq)→ φq),
3. K(pφq) if φ is valid,
4. K(pφ→ ψq)→ (K(pφq)→ K(pψq)).
This shows that (at least for predicate symbols) mere belief in soundness is already
deadly– even without soundness itself!
See Alexander (preprint) for several arguments7 for the philosophical plausi-
bility of knowledge which fails K(K(φ) → φ). I became even further convinced
of this when I read, in Shapiro (1998), about remarks Go¨del made at the Gibbs
lecture (Go¨del (1951)). The main objection (I think) to admitting the possibility of
¬K(K(φ) → φ) is that truthfulness is built into the very definition of knowledge.
But in his lecture, Go¨del distinguished between objective knowledge and subjective
knowledge, so that, for example, mathematicians might subjectively come to know
that mathematics is sound, through some argument strictly outside mathematics
itself– an empirical argument, say. Thus the mathematician might understand,
subjectively, that K(φ)→ φ holds for her knowledge, while rejecting K(K(φ)→ φ)
(say, upon considering the second incompleteness theorem), not because of doubting
the truth of K(φ)→ φ, but rather because of doubting the mathematical provability
of it.
Section 5 is particularly relevant: epistemological traditions should assume a back
seat when in conflict with practical applications. A truthful knowing machine which
7 And see van Fraassen (2011) for another argument of the same, when K represents
belief rather than knowledge.
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knows its own code could be useful in the real world, even without knowing its own
truthfulness. We could, perhaps, sidestep the issue by calling such a machine a “be-
lieving machine” rather than a “knowing machine”, but this would be disingenuous,
because we know the machine is truthful; to call it a believing machine would be
to suggest it might be capable of asserting falsities.
Further Work. One obvious direction to take from here is to expand the list of
paradoxes treated by global necessitation. One particularly interesting paradox is
found on pp. 260–261 of Horsten & Leitgeb (2001). This paradox can be formally
treated with the methods of the current paper, but as there are no agents involved
in it, philosophical justification will require careful treatment in a future paper.
Having obtained, through global necessitation, consistent variations of certain
paradoxical systems, one thing to consider is: which of these consistent systems can
be fused while preserving consistency? (Compare the work of Friedman & Sheard
(1987) on axioms about self-referential truth.) For example, by merging ideas from
the proofs of Theorems 3.6. and 4.7., it is possible to show that if n > 1 then
the following system is consistent and does not prove p1 → K(p1), in a language
containing operators K, , and atoms p1, . . . , pn, thus “simultaneously resolving”
Fitch’s and the Surprise Examination Paradox:
1. (Global) K(φ→ ψ)→ K(φ)→ K(ψ).
2. (Global) Tn, by which is meant p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pn.
3. (Global)
∧n
i=1((¬Ti)→ K(¬Ti)), where Ti abbreviates p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pi.
4. (Global) (
∧n
i=1 ¬K(pi)) ∨K(⊥).
5. (Global) (φ→ ψ)→ ((φ)→ (ψ)).
6. (Local) The strong knowability thesis: ⋄(K(φ)).
7. (Local) K(φ)→ φ.
8. The rules of global necessitation for K and .
Note that in the above system we’ve localized ⋄(K(φ)); if we kept it global, the
same consistency proof would not work (the Preliminary Claims would be hard
to reconcile). The consistency or inconsistency of the resulting system is presently
unknown to me (even if ⋄(K(φ)) were weakened to φ→ ⋄(K(φ))).
A similar question can be glossed provocatively:
Is it possible for a truthful knowing machine to know its own code,
and simultaneously attend a class in which a surprise examination
next week is announced?
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